Palestinians have many centuries of history in the Middle East. Judea, home of the Jews in ancient times, was conquered by Romans and renamed Palestine, which was in turn later conquered by Arabs. Following the Balfour Declaration in 1917,†the League of Nations created the British Mandate for Palestine, recognizing the "historical connection of the Jewish people" with the area and calling upon the United Kingdom to "secure establishment of the Jewish National Home." The Arabs resented the arrival of Jews and rioted and ultimately revolted, causing Britain to halt Jewish immigration to Palestine in 1939. Following the killing by the Nazis of six million Jews in the Holocaust, however, pressure increased on Britain increased to allow Jewish immigration to Palestine.† In 1947, the UN partitioned the land into Arab and Jewish states, and war broke out. Israel won its War of Independence, and in the process created several hundred thousand Palestinian refugees. Both sides view this same history very differently. †
1. Palestinians.
While "Palestinian" used to refer to anyone of any religion or ethnic group whose origins were in Palestine, today the term refers to Arabs displaced by the Israeli War of Independence and their descendents. The Palestine National Charter, as revised by the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1968, defines Palestinians as "those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there," adding that "[a]nyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father -- whether inside Palestine or outside it -- is also a Palestinian."
(a) Palestinian Liberation Organization.
For three decades, the primary representative of the Palestinians was the Palestine Liberalization Organization (PLO). The PLO was founded in 1974 by Egypt and the Arab League to serve as the coordinating mechanism for Palestinian organizations. The PLO has a nominal legislative body, the Palestinian National Council (PNC), but actual power resides with the PLO Executive Committee, made up of 18 members elected by the PNC, and its Chairman.
The PLO was and continues to be dominated by Al Fatah, the largest group, whose leader, Yasir Arafat, was Chairman of the PLO from 1969 to his death on November 11, 2004. He was succeeded by the current Chairman, Mahmoud Abbas (also known as Abu Mazen), who is also the leader of Fatah. Other major groups in the PLO include the Syrian-backed As Saiqa and the Marxist-oriented Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In 1974, the United Nations General Assembly granted the observer status to the PLO, and in 1976 it was admitted to the Arab League and recognized by that organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
The PLO was initially committed to the annihilation of the Israel. As amended in 1968, the Palestine National Charter provided that establishment of Israel was "entirely illegal," Zionism is "racist and fanatic in its nature," Israel is "the instrument of the Zionist movement" and liberation of Palestine "will destroy the Zionist and imperialist presence." Accordingly, the PLO has sponsored innumerable guerrilla raids and other attacks on Israeli civilian and military targets. Nevertheless, over time the PLO has come to accept a "two-state" solution and has toned down its rhetoric.
(b) Palestinian Authority.
The Palestinians have an interim government, or at least an interim administrative apparatus, in the form of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA or PA). The PA currently exercises civilian and security control in parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It was established in 1994, as a result of the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP or "Oslo Peace Accords") between Israel and the PLO, supposedly as a five-year transitional body during the anticipated period of final status negotiations between the two parties. The PA then took over many of the PLO administrative and negotiating roles with respect to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, while the PLO continued to act as an umbrella group representing Palestinian interests both inside those areas and elsewhere in the world.
While remaining Chairman of the PLO, Arafat became the first President of the PA upon its creation in 1994. His role was validated by the first PA election in January 1996 – and the last for nearly a decade. Arafat remained President until his death in November 2004, at which point Palestinian house speaker Rauhi Fattouh became interim President but never formally assumed the title. A new PA Presidential election was held in January 2005 and won by Abbas.
(c ) Hammas Election.
The Palestinians also elect the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC, sometimes referred to as the Palestinian Parliament). The PLC has 133 members -- 66 members elected in 16 multi-seat constituencies, 66 elected proportional to the vote for each party, plus the President as an ex officio member. After Abbas, head of the dominant Fatah party, won the 2005 PA Presidential election in 2005, Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) was victorious in the legislative election held in January 2006 (after having boycotted the Presidential election a year earlier).
Hamas is classified as a terrorist organization by the United States and is similarly classified by the European Union. Consequently, the United States and the EU, the largest donors to the PA, quickly suspended financial assistance to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (although continuing various types of humanitarian aid for the Palestinian people); and Canada and some other countries did likewise. In 2005, foreign funding for the PA totaled about $1.3 billion of its annual budget of $1.9 billion, and almost all of this was cut off. In addition, Israel, froze transfer of $50 to $75 million a month in tax revenues, import duties and other receipts collected on behalf of the PA. On January 30, 2006, the Quartet conceded that it was inevitable that future assistance would be reviewed by donors on the basis of commitment by the Hamas-led PA to three conditions: nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations. After dire reports by the World Bank predicting a complete economic collapse of the Palestinian economy, however, on May 9, 2006, the Quartet announced the formation of a "temporary international mechanism" to distribute humanitarian aid in the West Bank and Gaza without going through the Hamas-controlled bureaucracy.
(d) Peace Process.
The election of Hamas indefinitely stalled a productive but somewhat faltering peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. While the milestones are the same, the peripatetic peace process is viewed quite differently from the Palestinian side than from the Israeli.
After the Israeli War of Independence in 1848-49, Israel and the Palestinians were engaged in constant strife faring into sporadic outbreaks of major conflict. The latter category includes the 1978 Operation Litani against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in southern Lebanon, 1981 PLO rocket attacks and Israeli bombing of PLO targets in southern Lebanon, 1982 Peace in Galilee offensive into Lebanon in response to terrorist attacks, first Intifadah beginning in 1987, 1993 Operation Accountability (called the "Seven Day War" by the Lebanese) week-long military campaign directed at Shiite Muslim Hezbollah, 1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath fighting with Hezbollah, second ("al-Aqsa") Intifadah in 2000 and 2006 Israel-Lebanon Hezbollah War.
Interspersed with the violence were several apparently sincere efforts at achieving peace. Following on the heels of the first Intifadah, PLO Chairman Yasser angered much of the rest of the world by openly supporting Saddam Hussein and Iraq in the First Gulf War in 1990. Nevertheless, on September 13, 1993, Israel and the PLO agreed to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP or "Oslo Peace Accords"), whose signature was accompanied by the famous handshake PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on the White House Lawn. Encouraged by the Oslo Peace Accords and five subsequent implementing agreements, in September 1999, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PA President Yasser Arafat agreed to start work on a framework agreement on permanent status issues, anticipating reaching a final agreement within a year. But by the one-year deadline, in September 2000, a Second Intifadah had broken out. Things started looking up again, however, with the presentation to Israel and the Palestinians on April 30, 2003 of A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (the "Roadmap"), which was developed by the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nation (the "Quartet"). After both sides accepted, at least in principle, a "two-state" solution, however, each argued that the other was not living up to its commitments, the violence continued, Hamas won the PA elections in January 2006 and the "July War" (Second Lebanon War") broke out the next summer.
(e) Mecca Accord.
In the wake of the elections, while Abbas remained as President, tensions grew between his Fatah faction and Hamas. The Fatah movement refused to join a government formed by Hamas, and Hamas tried to form a controversial new Special Forces unit. Sporadic violence broke out and escalated, with militant clashes in the streets reminiscent of medieval feuding or old-style gang warfare. After nearly a year of being unable to reach consensus with Hamas on formation of a government and continued violence, people on both sides being killed and injured, in December 2006 President Abbas called for early elections. Hamas officials challenged the legality of this move, characterizing the Abbas action as an attempted Fatah coup, using undemocratic means to overthrow the results of a democratic election. The violence persisted.
After attempts by Egypt and Syria to mediate between Fatah and Hamas failed, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia invited all the key leaders of both factions to Mecca for negotiations. Following two days of talks, leveraged promises of massive Saudi financial assistance, the delegations reached an agreement. On February 8, 2007, rival Fatah and Hamas agreed to form a coalition government and end the feuding. The Mecca Accord took the form of a letter written by PA President Abbas, a Fatah leader. It calls upon Hamas to "respect international resolutions and the agreements signed by the Palestine Liberation Organization." The wording is a compromise acceptable to Hamas, which has refused to endorse the 1993 Oslo Accords and other agreements negotiated by the Fatah-dominated PLO with Israel and other members of the international community. The Mecca Accord does not specifically require recognition of the right of Israel to exist, acceptance of past peace agreements or renunciation of terrorism. Consequently, it appears unlikely to be accepted by the United States and other international donors as meeting the conditions for restoring funding to the PA cut off after the Hamas victory in the January 2006 elections.
(f) Collapse of National Unity Government.
Quite quickly, the Mecca Accord appeared to be unraveling, and factional hostilities resuming. With Prime Minister Abbas and Hamas seemingly unable to cooperate in a PA coalition government, the status of the peace and permanent status negotiations was again thrown very much into doubt. The aid embargo against Hamas and other sanctions may well have persuaded Hamas that it could not effectively govern without international legitimacy. But, as the chief of Shin Bet, the Israeli internal security service (Shin Bet) has poined out, "it also drove Hamas toward Iran," adding that "[o]ne of the bad fruits of the isolation of Hamas is the influence of Iran and its money."
In June 2007, the situation deteriorated into what amounted to a five-day civil war in the Gaza Strip. In the Gaza Strip, major fighting broke out on June 10; on June 11 Hamas took over northern city of Beit Hanoun; on June 12 Hamas fighters took control of the headquarters of Fatah in Gaza and the towns of Beit Lahiya and Jabaliya; by June 13 Hamas was in control of the north of Gaza strip and most of Gaza City; on June 14 Hamas overran the last two Fatah outposts in Gaza City; and on June 15 Hamas declared it was in full control of the Gaza Strip. Also on June 15, violence broke out in the West Bank with the killing of a known Hamas militant; and on June 16 a Fatah-linked militant group stormed Hamas-controlled Parliament based in Ramallah. Over 100 people were killed in what both sides, Hamas and Fatah, acknowledged amounted to a civil war
On June 14, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas announced the dissolution of the national unity government and declared a state of emergency. He dismissed Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniya andappointed Salam Fayyad in his place. New elections are promised. But their timing is unclear. The civil war and the consequent collapse of the Palestinian coaltion government casts doubt not only on the viability of the "two state" solution, but on the entire Middle East peace process.
2. Issues.
In his 2007 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush reiterated his frequently stated position that "we're pursuing the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state living side-by-side with Israel in peace and security." How to reconcile this position with the United States reaction to the Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian election is a challenge -- not only because the victor in a supposedly "free and fair" election is classified as a terrorist organization, but also because Hamas continues to make clear its objection not only to peace with its neighbor but to the Israel's very existence. Apart from being an example of "be-careful-what-you-wish for," the dilemma may result in part from equating democratic government with free and fair elections, whereas the former assumes a number of other predicates (including a commonly accepted body of law, freedom of expression and other civil liberties, protection of minorities, separation of powers, and other elements).
(a) Foreign Aid.
As with Israel, foreign assistance is a crucial issue for the Palestinians. Since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the United States has committed more than $1.8 billion (an average of about $85 million per year) in economic assistance to the Palestinians. Most of this aid (around 80 percent), has been channeled through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The U.S. began providing assistance for the Palestinians in 1950 with contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the international body created to provide food, shelter, medical attention, and education for Palestinian refugees. The largest infusion of funds was $400 million to implement the 1998 Wye River Memorandum (disbursed over the period 200-03, along with "regular" funding of about $75 million per year). Since the formation of a Hamas-led PA government, the United States has provided a total of $300 million in humanitarian and other aid to the Palestinians, of which $245 million was set aside for basic human health needs, $42 million for promoting democratic alternatives to Hamas, and $13 million in project support costs and oversight activities.
According to annual foreign operations legislation, Congressionally approved funds for the West Bank and Gaza Strip cannot be used for the Palestinian Authority, unless the President submits a waiver to Congress citing that doing so is in the interest of national security. To date, the United States has provided direct assistance to the PA on only four occasions, once during the Administration of President Bill Clinton and three times under President George W. Bush. Immediately after signature of the Oslo Accords, in 1993-04 (FY 1994) the United States gave $36 million through the Holst Fund administered by the World Bank for direct aid to the PA and an additional $5 million in cash and equipment for the Palestinian police. Ten years later, following development of the Roadmap and its acceptance by the Palestinians and Israel, in 2003 (FY 2003) the United States provided $20 million for PA infrastructure projects. The next year, in late 2004 (FY 2005), after a compromise with Congress, the Bush Administration provided $20 million to the PA to pay overdue utility bills to Israel (thus freeing up $20 million in other revenues to fund the January 2005 PA election). Finally, following a visit to the White House by newly-elected PA President Abbas, in May 2005, Bush Administration transferred an additional $50 million to the PA (but that transfer was ultimately rescinded after the formation of a Hamas-led government in 2006). The U.S. has never provided any direct aid to the PLO.
For several years, Congress has mandated that United States aid to the Palestinians be tightly monitored in order to prevent diversion to terrorist groups or for corrupt purposes. The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY 2006 required USAID audits of all contractors and grantees, and significant subcontractors and subgrantees, under the West Bank and Gaza Program on annual basis, and it specified that up to $1,000,000 of appropriated economic support funds could be used in addition to funds otherwise available for such purpose. It also required the U.S. Comptroller General to audit all funds for the program. In addition, Congress stipulated that no U.S. aid can be provided to a future Palestinian state unless the Secretary of State certifies, among other things, that leadership of the new state has been democratically elected, is committed to peaceful coexistence with Israel, and is taking appropriate measures to combat terrorism. Congress has prohibited any assistance to the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation (used for inciting violence against Israelis).
After Hamas won the elections for the Palestinian Authority in January 2006, Congress passed the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act. It confirmed that it is the Policy of the United States "to support a peaceful, two-state solution to end the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians" in accordance with the Roadmap. The Act then prohibited assistance to the Hamas-controlled PA unless the President certifies that Hamas has met seven requirements, including acknowledging the right of Israel to exist, committing itself to previous agreements (including the Roadmap) and disassociating itself from all terrorist activities. The President may, however, waive the prohibition with respect to the administrative and personal security costs of the Office of the President of the PA and various activities of the PA President, as well as for the PA judiciary branch and other entities upon certifying that such waiver "is in the national security interest of the United States.
In January 2007, the Bush Administration sought to have the State Department release $86.4 million to strengthen security forces loyal to Palestinian President Abbas, to assist in the power struggle against Hamas. An unidentified "U.S. government document" was widely quoted as announcing that the $86 million was "assist the Palestinian Authority presidency in fulfilling PA commitments under the road map to dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism and establish law and order in the West Bank and Gaza." The proposal proved, however, highly controversial. Representative Nita Lowey (D-NY), as Chair of the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, of the House Committee on Appropriations put a hold on the funding. She and other Congressional representatives, both Democrats and Republicans were not convinced the money would go to train and equip Abbas security forces and were concerned that it could instead end up in the hands of Hamas.
In his proposed budget for Fiscal Year 2008, President George W. Bush requested $77 million for Palestinian humanitarian relief. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explained, "[o]ur goal with the Palestinians this year, working with Israel and responsible Arab governments, is to empower President Abbas – to help him reform Fatah, provide security in the Palestinian territories, provide essential services to his people, and strengthen the political and economic institutions of his state."
(b) Palestinian State.
The Palestinian Liberation Organization (through its Palestinian National Council) declared a State of Palestine at a meeting in Algiers back on November 15, 1988. That alleged state, of course, never had sovereignty over any territory. When it came time to actually exercising jurisdiction, the 1993 Oslo Accords provided for creation of the Palestinian Authority, and the PA currently enjoys civil and some security control in areas of the Gaza Strip and West Bank.
All parties concerned are now, in principle, committed to a two-state solution to achieve peace in the Middle East. The Roadmap, put forward by the Quartet and accepted by both the Palestinian Authority (before the Hamas election) and Israel (with reservations), is unequivocal on this point. In exchange for Palestinian affirmation of the right of Israel to exist in peace and security, Israeli leadership affirmed its commitment to creation of a Palestinian state, and both sides agreed to end violence against each other. Israeli-Palestinian negotiations were supposed to "aim at a permanent status agreement in 2005"; and an international conference was supposed to lead "to a final, permanent status resolution on borders, Jerusalem, refugees, and settlements" and to support a comprehensive peace settlement between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and Syria, as soon as possible." To date, between the idea and the reality has fallen a very dark shadow.
(c) Jerusalem.
Of all the obstacles to peace in the Middle East, the status of Jerusalem, and particularly of East Jerusalem, may well be the most difficult. The issue has profound religious, as well as political and strategic dimensions, since Jerusalem is considered a holy city in three major religions. Jerusalem was the ancient capital of Judea and is sacred to Jews as home for the Western Wall (or Wailing Wall) and the Temple Mount, to Christians for the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and to Muslims for the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, among other sites and objects of major spiritual and historical significance.
The status of Jerusalem is a major point of contention between the United States and the Palestinians, as well as the Palestinians and the Israelis. Israel declared Jerusalem to be its capital in 1950 and after Six Day War in 1967 passed legislation incorporating the whole of the city. The United States has acknowledged the choice by Israel of its capital in the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 and subsequent legislation, but has never actually moved the U.S. Embassy (although continues to maintain a consulate there).
The PA, for its part, has proclaimed the intention to designate East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state. In response, in the 2003 appropriations legislation consolidated appropriations bill for FY 2003, Congress prohibited the use of funds to create another U.S. government office in Jerusalem "for the purpose of conducting official United States Government business with the Palestinian Authority over Gaza and Jericho or any successor Palestinian governing entity provided for in the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles [Oslo Accords]."
Jerusalem has been conquered more than three dozen times in its long history, and there is no easy solution to its permanent status. In consequence, the Roadmap provides merely that that a final and comprehensive permanent status agreement is to contain "a negotiated resolution on the status of Jerusalem that takes into account the political and religious concerns of both sides, and protects the religious interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims worldwide, and fulfills the vision of two states, Israel and sovereign, independent, democratic and viable Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security."
(d) Boundaries.
The 1993 Oslo Accords, supra, provided for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank and affirmed the Palestinian right to self-government through the creation of the Palestinian Authority. The 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II), the second stage in the process, divided the West Bank into three administrative categories: Area A, with full responsibility for civil administration and security resting with the PA, includes the seven major Palestinian population centers in the West Bank (Nablus, Kalkilya, Tulkarem, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jenin and Hebron); area B, with PA civil responsibility and Israel retaining overriding security control, includes an additional 450 Palestinian towns and villages; and area C, under full Israeli control, covers the remaining bulk of the territory. These areas are not contiguous, but rather scattered haphazardly throughout the territory, and the current situation more closely resembles parts of two states superimposed on one another than a blueprint for a "two-state" solution. The separation of Gaza from the West Bank by Israeli in between (somewhat like Pakistan before the separation of Bangladesh in 1971) contributes to administrative difficulties.
For most of the past 15 years, Middle East diplomacy, including the Roadmap, has been based on a gradualist approach, persuading Israelis and Palestinians to build up some mutual confidence gradually through small, incremental advances. Recently, however, leaders in the United States and elsewhere have apparently begun coming around to the view that more radical measures are warranted to keep the peace process alive. Reports circulated in the press and blogs in December 2006 that the Bush Administration was considering a plan to declare an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders by the end of 2007. Such an approach appears somewhat to echo a concept promoted by King Abdullah II of Jordan a few months earlier and similar ideas promoted by the Egyptian government.
No discussion of United States policy toward the Palestinians and the particular issue of boundaries would be complete without mention of the book by former President Jimmy Carter entitled Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid, released in November 2006. President Carter accuses Israel of creating an apartheid system in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. He goes so far as to claim that:
"Regardless of whether Palestinians had no formalized government, one headed by Yasir Arafat or Mahmoud Abbas, or one with Abbas as president and Hamas controlling the parliament and cabinet, Israel's continued control and colonization of Palestinian land have been the primary obstacles to a comprehensive peace agreement in the Holy Land."
Such inflammatory rhetoric – particularly coming from an ex-President who won the Nobel Peace Prize for mediating the Camp David Accords and other international conflict resolution efforts – could not help but further politicize Middle East issues. The predictable result was to rally Democrats in vocal support of Israel, with Speaker of the House or Representatives Nancy Pelosi taking the lead in insisting that ‘[w]ith all due respect to former President Carter, he does not speak for the Democratic Party on Israel," that "Democrats have been steadfast in their support of Israel from its birth, in part because we recognize that to do so is in the national security interests of the United States," and further that "[w]e stand with Israel now and we stand with Israel forever."
(e) Settlements.
Related to the issue of boundaries is the issue of the Israeli settlements in occupied territories, particularly in the West bank. From the Palestinian point of view, the continuing existence of these settlements in remains a major roadblock to permanent status negotiations and lasting peace. The Palestinians contend that nearly one-third of the lands on which the settlements sit is privately owned by Palestinians, which claim has recently been reconfirmed by a report from Americans for Peace Now and corroborated by Israeli government data. The Israeli barrier in the area, which at the beginning of 2007 was about 60 percent complete, is also a significant barrier to peace negotiations as well as severely restricting the lives of Palestinians who live in its vicinity (in impeding their ability to travel freely within the West Bank and to access work in Israel).
(f) Refugees.
As a sine qua non for agreement to a "two-state" solution, powerful Palestinian Arab groups continue to demand "haq al-auda" or the "right of return," supported by several United Nations resolutions. Perhaps 700,000 or more Palestinians were driven from their homes during the 1948-49 Israeli War of Independence and another 400,000 or so in the 1967 Six-Day War, which with descendents could number could mean five to eight million refugees. What is known precisely is that, at present, 1.3 million live in dire conditions in camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank, and Gaza.
Israel, whose population of about seven million people is already about 20% Arab, maintains that absorption of several million Palestinian refugees would destroy the character of the Jewish state. From the point of view of the Palestinians, even were they to forsake a right of return, the problem is that other countries have not been warmly welcoming either. Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan have each in turn declined to accept massive numbers of refugees, claiming that the influx hundreds of thousands of Palestinians would jeopardize their own demographic and other balances. Hence, all are at least theoretically in favor of the Palestinians having their own state, although they undoubtedly continue to harbor differing views of its boundaries, resources, politics and other crucial attributes.
As of its summit held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on March 28-29, 2007, the League of Arab States was still
insisting on its 2002 land-for-peace proposal to Israel. That plan, sometimes known as the "Saudi Plan,' was
adopted by the Arab League in Beirut, Lebanon, in 2002. It calls for full normalization of relations with
Israel in exchange for Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders (requiring full evacuation of the West Bank,
the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights) and the establishment of a Palestinian state with its
capital in East Jerusalem. On the refugee issue, the Arab states continue to insist on U.N. Resolution 194
giving all Palestinian refugees the right to return, which Israel rejects.
Protect a Peaceful Palestinian Homeland.
Many people have been seeking "peace in our times" in the Middle East for centuries, even thousands of years. At various times, including in recent decades, this goal has seemed closer to attainable. In fact, in the past two decades both United States and Israeli national security assessments have undergone a sea change from total rejection of the idea of Palestinian statehood to embracing the two-state solution. Recently, however, hopes again plummeted in the wake of the Hamas election to control of Palestinian National Authority in January 2006 and the war between Hezbollah and Israel in southern Lebanon the following July. Still, with all the chaos and uncertainty, the one thing that appears to remain constant is that the pursuit of peace is the only viable objective and strategy. The Palestinians can only acquire their state at the negotiating table, Israel will never be truly free without achieving peaceful relations with its neighbors, and the continuing explosive situation in the Mid East (even apart from the Iraq War and Iranian nuclear aspirations) may threaten the security and well-being of the entire world.
The question of continuing foreign assistance, or at least humanitarian aid, to the Palestinians is critical and a conundrum. The United States pressed hard for free elections and the Palestinians did hold elections with an exceptionally high turnout in January 2006. To cut off all aid because we do not like the result seems a rather undemocratic statement. On the other hand, the U.S. government, is emphatically opposed to Hamas as a terrorist organization, and the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act forbids almost all aid to the Palestinian Authority while it remains headed by Hamas and Hamas continues to support terrorism. The European Union and other Western countries continue to feel likewise.
At present this has resulted in a delicate balancing act – providing assistance to the Palestinians but not through their elected representatives, in particular the PA. According to United Nations, U.S., E.U. and International Monetary Fund accounts, despite the international embargo against the PA, significantly more aid was delivered to the Palestinians in 2006 after the Hamas election than in 2005. Instead of to the PA, most of the money went directly to individuals or through humanitarian relief agencies like the World Food Program. U.N. and I.M.F. figures show that the Palestinians received $1.2 billion in aid and budgetary support in 2006, about $300 per capita, compared with $1 billion in 2005. While the U.S. and the E.U. led the boycott, they too gave more to the Palestinians in 2006 than 2005, with this country increasing its aid to $468 million in 2006, up from $400 million the previous year. While this conduct is widely considered to satisfy the competing imperatives of fighting terrorists but recognizing humanitarian concerns, circumventing the PA in aiding the Palestinians people does free up some funds and energies that would otherwise have to be expended by Hamas.
While acknowledging the inherent tensions and contradictions in present conduct, we might recognize that there may be no better alternatives, at least for the short-term. As even the Israel government has, seeking to isolate Hamas (particularly after its election victory) and to starve or further demean the Palestinians is most likely to drive both further into the arms of Iran. This is, of course, of critical concern not only to the United States, but also to numerous other countries for a wide variety of reasons. Indeed, one of the primary motivations of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, a Sunni Muslim, for finally intervening with the Mecca summit may well have been to curve the escalating influence of Shiite-dominated Iran with the Palestinians and in the Middle East generally.
Furthermore, there are not only broader systemic but also longer-term considerations at stake. From the point of view of Palestinian Arabs, time is on their side. One aspect of this long-term perspective may be manifest in the number of suicide bombers willing to self-detonate to earn an eternal place in paradise. But factors other than desperation are also reflected in changing tides. One has only to stroll through Harrods in London, along the Champ-ElysČes in Paris or into the Intercontinental Hotel in Geneva to realize the major inroads by Arabs into the international mainstream. Still, while increased intermingling may or may not breed enhanced acceptance, on the negative side, starving and humiliating more Palestinians into a nothing-to-lose mentality is almost certainly unconducive to peaceful relations.
Belatedly, at the eleventh hour of his Presidency, George W. Bush has undertaken a mission to achieve a comprehensive Middle East peace treaty before he leaves office. It has been tried many times before, and the obstacles are immense. Still, diplomacy seems vastly preferable to the current state of armed confrontation, with the Israelis remaining justifiably obsessed with security concerns and the Palestinians still mired in abject poverty.
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