War is a major policy issue, not a partisan issue. The question is how to rise above partisan domestic politics in order to develop a strategy for disengagement from the War in Iraq.
1. Background on the War in Iraq.
While President George W. Bush has persisted in linking the events of September 11, 2001 and the invasion of Iraq, others contend that they bear little or no real relationship to each other. Be that as it may, little need be reviewed by way of factual background leading up to the current Iraq War.
(a) Questionable Origins.
The Iraq War – christened by the Bush Administration "Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)," referred by others as the Second or Third "Gulf War," and labeled by critics as the "Occupation of Iraq" or more simply "George Bush’s War" – began with the United States-led invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003.
The original justification for the Iraq War presented by President George W. Bush, and by his emissary Secretary of State Colin Powell before the United Nations, was that Iraq had or would soon have weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) justifying a preemptive strike to eliminate a threat to the United States and its allies and interests. No evidence of significantly threatening WMDs was found, however, even after the invasion. Consequently, the Bush Administration altered its claims to an alleged connection between Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and al-Queda, suggesting that the Iraqi dictator had some involvement in the events of 9/11. When evidence of such a linkage also failed to materialize, the emphasis again shifted to the notion of bringing democracy to the Iraqi people. So far, however, few people think that the new government in Baghdad is covering itself with glory in meeting the needs of the Iraq people or establishing stability Iraq or the region.
(b) "Mission Accomplished" in 2003.
The regime of Saddam Hussein was swiftly toppled and the Bush Administration was quick to declare victory. On May 1, 2003, after his infamous landing on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, President Bush declared an end to major combat in Iraq under a huge "Mission Accomplished" banner. But internecine sectarian violence has persisted, with an active insurgency against the United States, its coalition forces and the new Iraqi government. Some Islamist fundamentalist leaders see themselves as fighting a religious war to liberate Iraq of foreign non-Muslim occupiers and their Iraqi collaborators.
(c) Capture, Trial and Execution of Saddam Hussein.
In July 2005, the Special War Crimes Tribunal established by the Iraqi Governing Council filed charges against Saddam Hussein and seven co-defendants. Saddam and his Sunni cohorts were accused of murdering148 Shiite Muslims in the town of Dujail (Al-Dujayl) following a failed 1982 assassination attempt against the Iraqi President. In November 2006, having been found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity (including murder), Saddam and two co-defendants were sentenced to death. Four days after the highest court in Iraq rejected his appeal, Saddam was hanged on December 30, 2006.
Meanwhile, a second trial began in August 21, 2006 against Saddam Hussein. He and six co-defendants were accused of genocide in connection with the killings of 180,000 of Iraqi Kurds in a gas attack on a Kurdish village during the infamous Anfal campaign of the late 1980s. The charges against Saddam were dropped nine days after his execution.
(d) Elections, New Government and Continuing Sectarian Divisions.
As summarized in a Congressional Research Service report to Congress, Iraqi elections in 2005 "produced a permanent constitution and a broad-based but Shiite-led government that has been unwilling or unable to take major steps to reduce Sunni popular resentment and is now showing significant signs of fragmentation." There were "few signs of progress on reconciliation."
On January 30, 2005, the Iraqis elected a transitional National Assembly, a provincial assembly in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces and a Kurdistan regional assembly. The election was dominated by the Shiite Islamist "United Iraqi Alliance" (UIA), the Kurds, and a few secular parties. Sunni Arabs, who constitute 20% of the overall population, largely boycotted the elections.
On October 15, 2005, there was a referendum on a Constitution. The proposed Constitution was subject to veto by a two-thirds majority of voters in any three provinces. Among the most controversial provisions in the draft produced by a committee appointed by the National Assembly were those on oil and gas revenues. Opposition was strong among Sunnis, since the article in question gave regions a role in allocation of revenues (and Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq have few oil or gas deposits). The Constitution won the overwhelming backing of the Shia and ?urdish communities, but three Sunni-majority provinces rejected it (Al Anbar, Salah ad Din and Ninawa with respectively 97%, 82% and 55% against). Since only two met the 2/3 requirement, the Constitution was adopted.
On December 15, 2005, elections for a full-term Council of Representatives (COR) were held according to a formula designed to attract Sunni participation. Nevertheless, the UIA and the Kurds continued to dominate with nearly two-thirds of the COR seats. Largely due to pressure from Kurdish and other opposition groups, the UIA agreed to Nuri Kamal al-Maliki as Prime Minister.
2. 2007 New Directions.
Nearly four years into the Iraq War, it had become clear to almost everyone on all sides of the policy debate that things were not going well. Even the Bush Administration had to recognize that new strategies were needed and acted accordingly.
(a) Troop Surge.
On January 10, 2007, in a nationally televised speech, President George W. Bush announced a new strategy in Iraq, labeled "The New Way Forward." He explained:
"America will change our strategy to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to put down sectarian violence and bring security to the people of Baghdad. This will require increasing American force levels. So I've committed more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq. The vast majority of them -- five brigades -- will be deployed to Baghdad. These troops will work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in their formations. Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs."
Immediately thereafter, the President ordered an additional 30,000 United States troops to Iraq, bringing the total of our forces there to over 160,000.
According to the Congressional Research Service, the Surge in troop levels in Iraq has increased the cost of war there and in Afghanistan to $12 billion a month. Of this, about $10 billion is for obligations in Iraq, $1.9 billion for those in Afghanistan, and less than $100 million for enhanced security. The total spent to date for the Iraq War is nearing $0.5 trillion.
(b) Arming Sunni Arab Groups.
Four months or so into the Surge, the Bush Administration and Pentagon commanders in Iraq initiated a strategy fraught with risk. After spending more than $12 billion building up the new Shiite-dominated army and police force, the United States began providing arms, ammunition, cash, fuel and supplies to local Sunni Arab groups willing to turn on their prior allies, militants aligned with al-Queda.
Defenders of the new outreach policy insist that many of the Sunni groups have grown disillusioned with the extremist tactics, particularly suicide bombings killing many thousands of civilians, practiced by the radical, Islamist militants. They claim that, in exchange for the support, the Sunni groups have agreed to fight al-Qaeda and to halt attacks on American units. Critics, for their part, point out that, even if the new policy may make some sense in the short term, it is almost certainly tantamount to arming both sides for a future civil war. There is also the possibility the weapons could be used against United States soldiers and civilian contractors and coalition allies.
3. Recent Grim Assessments.
Nine months into the highly-controversial troop surge, Congress and the American public anxiously awaited assessments by the latest United States Commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq, General David H. Petraeus, and our Ambassador to that country, the Honorable Ryan C. Crocker, who were required by Congress to report by September 15, 2007. Several weeks before the assessment there were already charges flying about of "White House whitewash" and the like. Meanwhile, a number of other important reports, none of them good, were issued in August and September 2007.
(a) National Intelligence Estimate.
On August 23, 2007, the National Intelligence Council released an unclassified summary of the most recent National Intelligence Estimate on "Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive." As its title indicates, the messages were at best mixed. To quote the initial "Key Judgment" of the United States Intelligence Community:
"There have been measurable but uneven improvements in Iraq’s security situation since our last National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq in January 2007. The steep escalation of rates of violence has been checked for now, and overall attack levels across Iraq have fallen during seven of the last nine weeks. Coalition forces, working with Iraqi forces, tribal elements, and some Sunni insurgents, have reduced al Qa’ida in Iraq’s (AQI) capabilities, restricted its freedom of movement, and denied it grassroots support in some areas. However, the level of overall violence, including attacks on and casualties among civilians, remains high; Iraq’s sectarian groups remain unreconciled; AQI retains the ability to conduct high-profile attacks; and to date, Iraqi political leaders remain unable to govern effectively. There have been modest improvements in economic output, budget execution, and government finances but fundamental structural problems continue to prevent sustained progress in economic growth and living conditions."
(b) GAO Report to Congress.
On September 4, 2007, the Government Accountability Office released a Congressionally-mandated report on whether or not the new government of Iraq had met 18 benchmarks established by Congress. The independent assessment by the GAO was not encouraging:
"The Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the courageous efforts of coalition forces and progress that has been made in several areas, including Anbar Province. The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights of minority political parties in Iraq’s legislature are protected. The government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba’athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament. It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased -- a key security benchmark -- since it is difficult to measure whether the perpetrators’ intents were sectarian in nature, and other measures of population security show differing trends. As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and with homeland security goals, foreign policy goals, and other goals of the United States."
(c) CRS Report.
Shortly thereafter, on September 6, 2007, came more bad news, this time from the Congressional Research Service. The CRS report, an update of a previous assessment of Iraq governance in the post-Saddam era, begins with a grim summary:
"Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime, but much of Iraq remains violent because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, compounded by Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence that, in the judgment of many, constitutes a ‘civil war.’ Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs -- without dramatic improvements in levels of violence or clear movement toward national political reconciliation among Iraq’s major communities -- have intensified a debate within the United States over whether to reduce U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing initial U.S. goals."
It proceeds to detail, among other things, efforts by Prime Minister Al-Maliki In an effort "to rebuild what appears to be a collapsing government," including holding a August 2007 "crisis summit" intended to reach factional compromise and end cabinet boycotts.
(d) Petraeus/Crocker Reports.
General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker each testified before a joint hearing of the House of Representatives Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services on September 10, 2007 and before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the next day, September 11. In essence, they agreed that the Surge is working and should be continued.
General Petraeus testified that violence is down throughout Iraq, especially in key regions of the country such as Baghdad and Anbar province. Civilian deaths, however, remain at an unacceptable level. The general anticipated that United States troops in Iraq could return to pre-Surge levels by the summer of 2008 "without jeopardizing the security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve." This reduction by 30,000 combat forces, to roughly 130,000, could begin with withdrawal of a Marine contingent almost immediately. General Petraeus recommended further troop cuts eventually, but failed to specify how deep those cuts might be or when they might take place. In essence, "[t]he security situation in Iraq is improving," in Petraeus’ view, but "innumerable challenges lie ahead."
Ambassador Crocker delivered a more sober assessment. "There will be no single moment when we can claim victory," he observed, and "[a] ny turning point will likely be recognized only in retrospect." Like General Petraeus, the ambassador warned against precipitous withdrawal of our forces from Iraq. He also went so far as to compare the situation in Iraq to the struggle for states' rights and civil rights in the United States.
While few if any surprises punctuated the Petaeus or Crocker appearances, there was one telling moment. Senator John Warner (R-VA), a former Secretary of the Navy and Republcian Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, asked General Petraeus whether he felt that the Surge "is making America safer." The general replied: "Sir, I don't know actually. I have not sat down and sorted that out in my own mind."
(e) Presidential Assessments.
On September 13, 2007, nine months after declaring a "New Way Forward," President George W. Bush again took to the airwaves to announce yet another new plan for Iraq, this one based on the guiding principle of "Return on Success." "Our troops in Iraq are performing brilliantly," having "captured or killed an average of more than 1,500 enemy fighters per month since January," he reported. Also, "the Iraqi army is becoming more capable -- although there is still a great deal of work to be done to improve the national police." "Because of this success," the President was accepting the recommendations by General Petraeus to reduce the American presence in Iraq, including a total force reduction of 5,700 troops by Christmas.
Despite the series of relatively gloomy reports on the benchmarks, which were not mentioned in the speech, President Bush kept affirming his optimistic viewpoint, reiterating: "Now, because of the measure of success we are seeing in Iraq, we can begin seeing troops come home." While conceding that "[t]he [Iraqi] government has not met its own legislative benchmarks," he insisted that "Iraq's national leaders are getting some things done." The President concluded by reaffirming that he still believes the Iraq war to be winnable:
"It is never too late to deal a blow to al Qaeda. It is never too late to advance freedom. And it is never too late to support our troops in a fight they can win."
(f) National Security Council Report.
The next day, September 14, 2007, the National Security Council submitted its report on the 18 benchmarks. Not unexpectedly, the conclusions were more optimistic than those of the previous GAO report. The NSC concluded that the Iraqis have made satisfactory progress on nine benchmarks, while receiving unsatisfactory assessments on seven. Two benchmarks are not rated because the necessary preconditions were found to have been not yet present.
4. War Over the War.
The Iraq War, it must be recalled, did not commence on a partisan basis. The October 2002 Iraq War Resolution passed both the Senate and House with substantial majorities -- including a majority of Democratic Senators and a total of more than 100 Democrats. Many of us thought at the time, and many more have come to agree, that the Bush Administration was far less than truthful and accurate in presenting the dangers of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein -- and indeed lied this country into a war. But this is not time to indulge in "I told you so’s" or renewed bouts of righteous indignation. Questions of how or even why this came to pass, while they may be of extreme political and moral concern, are less important than the critical issue of where we go from here.
At present, with several notable exceptions, the United States Congress remains sharply divided along strict party lines over the Iraq War and in particular the question of troop redeployment:
(a) House of Representatives.
On July 12, 2007, the House of Representatives passed the Responsible Redeployment from Iraq Act by a vote of 223 to 201. The measure provided that the Secretary of Defense shall commence reduction of the number of United States armed forces in Iraq within 120 days after enactment and shall complete the reduction and transition to a "limited presence" by April 1, 2008. The majority was composed of 219 Democrats and 4 Republicans and the minority of 191 R’s and 10 D’s (with 8 not voting).
This was the second time this year that the Democratic-controlled House voted to set a deadline for troop withdrawal. On March 23, 2007, the House passed by 218 to 212 a fiscal 2007 Iraq War supplemental appropriations bill requiring the Secretary to commence redeployment of U.S forces from Iraq not later than March 1, 2008 and to complete such redeployment within 180 days. In the 218:212 count, only two Republicans voted with the majority and 14 Democrats against (with 1 "present" and 3 not voting). Later, President George W. Bush vetoed a modified version of the legislation, and the House failed to achieve the two-thirds vote necessary to override (with the 222 to 203 vote similarly divided along party lines).
(b) Senate.
On July 18, 2007 and again on September 21, 2007, the Senate failed to adopt a proposal that set a troop withdrawal timetable. On the first vote in July, the result was 52 in favor to 47 opposed with 1 not voting; 4 Republicans joined the Democrats in the majority and 2 Democrats voted with the Republicans in opposition. Despite the majority, since this was a cloture vote requiring 3/5 for passage, the proposal failed. The amendment in question would have required the Secretary of Defense to commence reduction of the number of United States forces in Iraq within 120 days of enactment and to complete the transition to "a limited presence and missions" by April 30, 2008. On the second vote in September, the count was 47 to 47 with 6 not voting (and 60 again needed for passage); 3 Republicans supported the proposal and 3 Democrats voted against. The new amendment would have required the Secretary of Defense to commence the reducing U.S. forces in Iraq not later than 90 days after enactment.
Previously, on March 29, 2007, the Senate had passed by 51 to 47 a version of the supplemental appropriations bill that would have required the President to commence the phased redeployment from Iraq not later than 120 days after enactment, with the nonbinding "goal" of redeploying all U.S. combat forces with some specified exceptions by March 31, 2008. Only two Senate R’s joined the 49 D’s in supporting the package.
(c) Iraq Study Group.
Last year, an attempt was made to surmount the political impasse over this prolonged and increasingly unpopular war. The Iraq Study Group was launched by a bipartisan group of members of Congress. This blue-ribbon commission was co-chaired by former Secretary of State James A. Baker III, a Republican, and former Indiana Democratic Congressman Lee H. Hamilton. The ISG report, released in December 2006, made 79 specific recommendations and anticipated that all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be withdrawn by the first quarter of 2008. The Baker-Hamilton report landed, however, like the proverbial "lead balloon," apparently "dead-on-arrival" with both the Bush Administration and Congress.
(d) Lack of Consensus.
The question remains of how to advance beyond party politics and to forge a consensus on ending United States involvement in a war that has already cost the lives of close to 4,000 brave U.S. military personnel, wounded tens of thousands of other Americans and caused untold numbers of Iraqi casualties. Some members of Congress have already risen above narrow partisanship to look at the situation objectively and have crossed party lines. Senator Joe Lieberman (D-CN) is probably the most famous or infamous Democrat repeatedly to come out as strongly supporting President Bush on the issue of the Iraq War. On the other hand, Senator John Warner (R-VA) recently indicated that he may support Democratic legislation ordering troop withdrawals if the President refuses to set a timetable soon. But the pace toward consensus is far too slow and the costs of procrastination far too deadly.
4. Casualties.
The latest official casualty counts in Iraq (as of September 16, 2007) show 3776 United States military fatalities (of 4084 Coalition total killed-in-action) and more than 36,943 U.S. wounded. These figures do not include casualties among civilian contractors and journalists, let alone the scores of thousands of Iraqis killed and wounded.
Progressing Beyond Partisanship.
The leaders and people of the United States have been deeply divided over the War in Iraq since before its inception. As it has dragged on, partisans on both sides have engaged in hurling epithets, with accusations of unthinking "stay-the-course" battling those of defeatist "cut-and-run." After it became clear that the situation was deteriorating precipitously, journalists encapsulated the options as "go big, go long or go home." One thing that is certain five years into the Iraq War is that neither slogans nor "spin" will extricate this country from a war where "victory" has become unattainable (assuming it ever was and whatever its conception at the outset). Starting inevitably from where we are now, the United States needs a feasible plan for extricating our troops, our country and the Iraqis from a disastrous situation largely of our own making as to which there are no good options.
American men and women have served bravely and honorably in Iraq; they have accomplished more, and they and their families have sacrificed more, than should ever have been expected of them. Now, there appears to be an emerging consensus, at least outside of Washington, D.C., that the United States should disengage from active combat in Iraq as expeditiously as can be accomplished consistent with: on the one hand, providing for the safe and orderly redeployment of our armed forces and civilian contractors, and, on the other, avoiding insofar as possible a catastrophic escalation of hostilities in Iraq and further destabilization of the Middle East region. Whatever the original motivating factors causing the Bush Administration to embroil the United States and other countries in the Iraq War, it is becoming clear to the vast majority of Americans that our continuing participation in what has clearly disintegrated into a partisan sectarian struggle is counterproductive. Our political leaders should try to reach across the aisle to forge a disengagement plan coupled with a viable long-term strategy for the area, in the interests both of our own and global security. Failing that, opponents in Congress may well have to use the "power of the purse" to force the Bush Administration to begin redeployment in the immediate future – on which issue, of course, the American public may weigh in heavily in the November 2008 elections.
The ongoing commitment of many tens of thousands -- over 160,000 – of United States troops (plus upwards of 100,000 civilian contractors) and millions of tons of essential equipment is not only jeopardizing U.S. homeland security, but also creating distractions from the true life-and-death war on terrorism. But even accepting the general principle of rapid redeployment of troops and redirection of efforts, crucial issues remain:
First, of course, come tactical questions as to how to redeploy, which must largely be left to the judgment and expertise of our military leaders. The most obvious exit from Iraq is fraught with pitfalls, since the only major route south to Kuwait is notoriously open and vulnerable to roadside bombings and other attacks. The initial push north at the inception of Operation Iraqi Freedom, it will be recalled, was exceedingly bloody, difficult and costly. Alternatively, it may be that the United States will seek to move major segments of our troops and equipment through the Kurdish area in northern Iraq and thereafter to use bases and ports in Turkey. Securing agreement to such a course may, however, be difficult, as United States relations with Turkey have been notably strained in the past few years. Whichever, it seems clear that redeployment will have to be accomplished in stages, with initial withdrawals to the four huge installations or "megabases" already established in Iraq followed by a series of carefully protected and coordinated land, air and sea operations. Six months may well prove an optimistic estimate of how quickly that can be safely accomplished – which is all the more reason to commence as soon as possible.
Second, beyond the practical details of disengagement in the internal affairs of Iraq, there are longer-term strategic dimensions. Many Americans equate redeployment with bringing our troops home, which may have been a viable option at various stages in this conflict. In bumper sticker terms: "Support our troops – bring them home." With the indisputable increasing influence of other external powers -- most notably Iran – in the internal affairs of Iraq, however, returning to this country immediately may no longer be an option for significant numbers of our armed forces.
The current proposals in Congress have been carefully crafted in terms of "redeployment," "reduction" and "transition" to a restricted role in Iraq itself, without addressing the underlying question of retaining a strategic presence in the Middle East. The options seem neither plentiful nor appealing. The United States could maintain a significant presence inside one or more of the megabases already established in Iraq or could enter into an agreement with the Kurds to create a new or enlarged facility in northeastern Iraq. Otherwise, the Pentagon might redeploy significant numbers of United States troops to our bases in neighboring countries, most likely Kuwait and Qatar. Reasonable military and political minds may differ as to which is the better option. But in either case, an enhanced naval presence in the Persian Gulf may be deemed strategically essential for the foreseeable future, which in turn may require increased carrier capacity.
Third, humanitarian considerations are pressing. President George W. Bush is, in a sense, correct about one thing concerning the Iraq War. In his recent unfortunate comparison before the Veterans of Foreign Wars, President Bush observed that "[o]ne unmistakable legacy of Vietnam is that the price of America's withdrawal was paid by millions of innocent citizens . . ." Americans cannot delude ourselves that any transition, whether now or years from now, will be orderly and without catastrophic consequences in-and-of-itself. We must anticipate that, due largely to our own unilateral actions, Iraq and its surrounding region will likely become more dangerous and chaotic however much the United States, the so-called "Coalition of the Willing," the United Nations or any other parties may try to mitigate the violence and disruption. But we must also recognize that continuing to try to quell indigenous sectarian struggles in Iraq, which have already erupted into a de facto civil war, will most likely only make things worse.
In the humanitarian realm, there is also a great and growing refugee problem. Most prevalent estimates appear to be that the Iraq War has already created nearly two million Iraqi refugees, most of whom have fled to Syria and Jordan, and that another two million or so Iraqis are displaced within their own country. Solving the refugee crisis cannot be effectively managed without cooperation of all six countries bordering Iraq — Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Turkey — and the help and money of other nations as well.
Fourth, from the broader international perspective, as a result of our intransigence in initiating and prolonging the Iraq War, the United States has unquestionably suffered a tremendous loss not only of prestige and respect, but also of trust and allegiance throughout the world. It will undoubtedly take a new President and perhaps decades to repair this damage.
For our own sake, as well as the interests of Iraq and its people, a return to diplomacy, to cooperation and consultations with other countries is essential. As the Iraq Study Group concluded, neither the turmoil in Iraq itself nor the broader destabilization of the Middle East to which it has contributed can be productively addressed without dealing directly with Iran and Syria. The United States will also need the help of other countries, including Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany (the last three of which have new governments) to help exert pressure to control strong sectarian and other partisan interests in the area: to prevent Iran from effectively taking over Iraq, either directly or through manipulation of the Shiite majority in southern Iraq; to keep Syria and other Sunni-dominated countries from intervening on behalf of Sunni Iraqis; and to dissuade Turkey from sending troops into Kurdish territories. More broadly, having scorned the United Nations at the inception of the war, the United States may now need international assistance more than ever. It is encouraging that the Security Council recently unanimously approved a U.S. and British resolution extending the mandate of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) for a year and giving the U.N. a more powerful advisory role. But that is only a start.
The bottom line is that, to end the tragedy of the Iraq War, it seems evident that the United States will have to adopt a more cooperative stance both at home and abroad. Our politicians should try to reach across the aisle and find common ground, in the interests both of our own and global security. It appears equally essential for our government and our country to reintegrate into the world community. Finally, for our own sakes – and particularly for the men and women who are so bravely and honorably serving in our armed forces -- we as citizens as well as our elected representatives need to revise our perspectives and thinking. We should all try focusing more on the consequences than on the politics of war.
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